In his May/June 1997 response to me, Mr. Till complained that I did not fulfill the requirement of "the burden of proof." By that I assume that he meant my evidence was not sufficiently compelling to convince him. I'm not surprised. His type of skepticism would not be persuaded, no matter how compelling the evidence. However, in this complaint he has misused the term "burden of proof." It is true that the person who defends the truth of a debated proposition must present convincing evidence to support its truth. But the person who denies the truth of the proposition has the burden to convincingly disprove the proposition-- that is the real burden of proof. The proof of a proposition is in the failure to prove the denial. If the defender of a proposition must produce objective evidence to prove it, then the opponent of the proposition must present objective evidence to disprove it. It is insufficient for the challenger to appeal to a fallacious presupposition as his sole objection. Why should the burden of proof be one-sided. In this debate, I am supposed to present evidence supporting the proposition that Jeremiah's prediction of the seventy-year captivity of the Jews is indeed a valid fulfilled prophecy. Till is supposed to discredit my evidence and prove that the prophecy is a fraud. I have presented verifiable objective evidence that Jeremiah's prophecy is valid and has been fulfilled. All Till needs to do is provide the objective evidence to the contrary--not extraordinary evidence, just ordinary evidence will be sufficient. So far Mr. Till has failed miserably on both counts.
Extraordinary Proof: Mr. Till appealed to an alleged law of evidence that states: "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof." On the basis of this "law" he complained that my evidence was not sufficiently extraordinary. But how extraordinary must the claim be before the "law" applies, and how extraordinary must the proof be before he will accept it? Should it be greater than what is accepted in a court of law? Should it be greater than what is required by the canons of historical research? Life is full of extraordinary events that we believe without extraordinary proof. Robert Ripley recorded thousands of extraordinary people and extraordinary events which we believe without extraordinary proof. Mr. Till does not intend for his "law" to apply to this type of extraordinary event; ordinary evidence is sufficient for him there. The bottom line is that Till's "law" really applies only to supernatural claims, not to extraordinary claims. So this "law" becomes rather ridiculous. If it is restated according to how Till intends it to be applied, it would read: "Supernatural claims require supernatural proof." So what kind of supernatural proof would Till accept? The witness of an angel? A notarized affidavit from God Himself? No. Till's anti-supernatural presupposition rejects the possibility of any supernatural proof. Thus, Till's "law" is just a clever restatement of his anti-supernatural presupposition in disguise. It means that Till will not accept any proof of fulfilled prophecy, no matter how extraordinary it may be.
Mr. Till declared: "My position is that exaggerations, deliberate falsifications, mistaken impressions, etc., in documents of prescientific times were far more likely than the suspension of recognized natural laws?" My question to Mr. Till is: What law of nature does prediction violate? Nearly every law of nature includes the capacity for predicting future events. In fact, the predictive capacity of a law of nature is one characteristic used to validate it. The more well defined the law, the greater its predictive power. Thus Newton's laws of motion enable astronomers to predict the exact position of the sun, moon, planets, and comets thousands of years in advance; and their predictive power enables astronauts to land on the moon, and to sent a space craft to a distant planet like the recent landing on Mars. Prediction is a necessary ingredient of normal living. Without the capacity for prediction, life would be hopelessly perilous. No one could safely drive a car, fly an airplane, or even cross the street. We would have no sports, business, or agriculture; in fact, animate life can scarcely survive without prediction.
So prediction is not what radical skeptics deny. They only object to predictions for which no natural law is known to them. In other words, their objection is based on ignorance, not knowledge. Indeed, many things involving prediction occur regularly in nature for which no one has yet determined a law. One must therefore assume that some such law exists. Till does not object to such assumptions nor to such unexplainable extraordinary predictions, nor does he demand extraordinary proof for them. Why? Merely because the phenomena are observable, not explainable. He does not even have to observe the extraordinary predictive ability himself; he is willing to accept the witness of someone else, perhaps someone like Robert Ripley, or even the report of an ancient observer. The only kind of prediction Mr. Till objects to, or for which he demands extraordinary proof, is a prediction attributed to God. Clearly this is a theological objection, not a logical one.
What radical skeptics like Mr. Till fail to realize is that their own anti-supernatural presupposition is based on a sequence of unverifiable fabulous claims, claims that they say should have extraordinary proof. Mr. Till's reasoning states: a common sense explanation is more likely than a fabulous claim. Now, most of the classical arguments favoring the existence of God are based on known laws of nature with which they are in harmony, whereas opposing arguments involve accepting unverifiable fabulous claims. For example, the argument from the law of cause and effect involves accepting one of two alternate claims: (1) a sufficient first cause based on the second law of thermodynamics which extrapolates to a beginning in the past and predicts an end in the future; or (2) an infinite sequence of causes contrary to the second law. Now, while neither claim can be proved or disproved rigorously, common sense and reasonableness say the first is more likely because it is conceivable, and is in harmony with perceived reality and with two verifiable laws of nature; whereas the second has characteristics of a fabulous claim--infinity (by definition an inconceivably large value) and the contradiction of a verifiable natural law. Now, the same observation is true for all the classical arguments. Those who choose to believe in God regard the joint consensus of the classical arguments to be far more likely and more than sufficient reason to believe, whereas atheists choose to believe the joint witness of a sequence of unverifiable fabulous claims. In the final analysis, it is a matter of choice. Mr. Till has chosen to accept the witness of a sequence of fabulous claims contrary to his own declared method of reasoning.
To those who believe in an omniscient God, the idea of fulfilled prophecy attributed to Him is not a fabulous claim, but what one would reasonably expect. To them an instance of such fulfilled prophecy requires only ordinary, not extraordinary, evidence as sufficient reason to believe it. I acknowledge that this debate is not about the existence of God, but the above discussion was necessary in order to let the reader see the true foundation of Till's anti-supernatural presupposition. It is not based on common sense and reason, but on a theological choice supported by a string of unverifiable fabulous claims that common sense and reasonableness reject. Logically it involves the fallacy known as a hasty generalization, and when appealed to in debates like this, it involves the fallacy of assuming the conclusion--circular reasoning. An unbiased skeptic will admit the possibility of fulfilled prophecy no matter how unlikely it may seem, and let the evidence decide the case. Many unlikely events are recorded in ancient records the validity of which historians accept on the basis of good (but not extraordinary) evidence. Not Mr. Till! He has repeatedly refused to debate under those conditions.
What Mr. Till means by "extraordinary proof" is evidence that is superior to what is possible to obtain from ancient records. He wants to evaluate historical evidence by a double standard, one that admits the possibility of natural events but denies the possibility of supernatural events. In other words, no matter how valid and convincing the ancient evidence may be otherwise, if it involves a possible fulfilled prophecy, the evidence automatically will be insufficient by Till's standard. He has insisted that the debate proceed, not on a level field, but with this theologically motivated double standard. Debating under this restraint is a distinct disadvantage because Till will claim a victory on the basis of this double standard no matter how convincing the evidence is otherwise. But I will continue to present the valid evidence, and to point out this double standard whenever Till imposes it. Discerning readers will see through this tactic and be able to evaluate the evidence in an unbiased manner without letting Till do their thinking.
Radical Skepticism: Mr. Till complained that I object to his appeal to an anti-supernatural presupposition. He does this on the basis that he thinks I have the same presupposition in areas outside the Bible. In this complaint Mr. Till is monotonously repetitive. We have discussed this issue in previous e-mail exchanges where I demonstrated that in a debate like this such an anti-supernatural presupposition is fallacious. In those exchanges, I have already answered his questions. In one such exchange I stated: "I do not advocate accepting all reported supernatural events as historical events. I advocate healthy skepticism, a skepticism that evaluates the evidence and accepts what is verifiable, a skepticism that is willing to give a reputable witness the benefit of the doubt." That means that I am willing to accept the historicity of reported supernatural events if they are verifiable, regardless of whether the source is the Bible, secular history, or a non-Christian religious historian. Also, I am willing to withhold judgment on some unverifiable supernatural events reported by reputable sources--after all, the events may have occurred. Without objective evidence to the contrary, who can be sure? Till can be sure only because he has accepted without proof his anti-supernatural presupposition. Till cannot justify his own radical skepticism by an appeal to my more moderate and reasonable skepticism. They are not the same.
It is irrelevant for him to insist that I waste the readers time by identifying what extra-Biblical miracles I would accept as historical. That has nothing to do with the debate at hand. That is another diversionary tactic to distract attention from his failure to adequately deal with the evidence I presented. In a previous e-mail exchange I documented two modern verifiable miracles. The evidence is undeniable and is available for Till to examine. Till has completely ignored these and has refused to comment on them. This indicates to me that Till is blindly committed to a radical skepticism that refuses to accept the possibility of supernatural events regardless of the evidence, extraordinary or otherwise.
All the Details: Mr. Till has insisted that "all the details" of the prophecy must be fulfilled. He stated that "at no time did Dr. Price address my claim that a genuine prophecy fulfillment would have to include fulfillment of all details and not just those that someone arbitrarily declares `central' ones." By that I suppose he means that all the minor details must be verified with objective evidence, not just the principal significant details. He is not satisfied that I validated the details of a fulfilled prophecy that he himself defined as essential for a genuine prophecy--the date of the prophecy, the duration of the 70 years, and the return of the Jews from captivity--now he insists that I must provide validating evidence for all the minor details. However, this is where the real burden of proof comes on the scene. It is Till's responsibility to provide objective evidence that the minor details were not fulfilled. In the absence of contrary evidence, common sense and reasonableness demand that if the essential details of a reported historical event are verified as true, then the minor unverified details can be regarded as true also. No canon of historical research denies this. This is true of prophecy also: in the absence of contrary evidence, if the essential details of a prophecy are verified as fulfilled [the details Till specified as essential], then the unverified details may be regarded as fulfilled also. What law of evidence would deny this? Let Till produce the objective evidence to the contrary or stop quibbling about unverified minor details.
Irrelevant Errancy: Because Till cannot provide objective evidence against the details of the prophecy under debate, he launched into an unsubstantiated attack on the integrity of the Bible as a whole, on the validity of the book of Jeremiah, and on the veracity of the prophet. This was his attempt to justify a charge of fraud. Concerning the Bible, he stated: "The Bible text, however, is a tangible existent that can be critically examined, and when it is so examined, we find that it is riddled with inconsistencies, discrepancies, and outright contradictions." He then indicated that he has many proofs of this statement which, of course, space did not permit him to provide.
Since Mr. Till introduced unsubstantiated claims, I am permitted to introduce some of my own. Radical skeptics like Mr. Till are unable to critically examine the text of the Bible in a neutral, unbiased manner. They approach the text with hostility and a theological bias that guarantees that every apparent inconsistency, discrepancy, or contradiction invariably will be labeled as an error. Any reasonable resolution of such apparent problems, which is appropriate in responsible criticism, is rejected by them, and is categorized as uncritical rationalization. This is not an accepted practice in a court of law or in reasonable historical research. Reasonable people regard such skepticism as radical dogmatism, not genuine critical thinking. Many proofs of this exist, but space does not permit their presentation other than those that appear in this debate.
Now all this wrangling over errancy is irrelevant to the topic under debate, namely, does the Bible contain a fulfilled prophecy? I have presented a prophecy that I claim was fulfilled. Till has admitted that an errant text may still contain valid accounts of historical events. So let him restrict his criticism to the prophecy under discussion. Let him produce objective evidence that this prophecy contains errors and was not fulfilled, and let him cease quibbling over the irrelevant topic of errancy in general. I have not appealed to the inerrancy of Scripture in the defense of this prophecy, so let Till cease appealing to his alleged doctrine of errancy in his attempt to disprove the prophecy. Let him produce an undeniable error in the debated prophecy, not a doctrine about errancy.
Jeremiah's Credibility: Since Mr. Till could not produce objective evidence that the debated prophecy was not fulfilled, he resorted to an attack on the prophet's credibility. He did this in the hope that he can produce a case for fraud. To do this he introduced another of Jeremiah's prophecies that he regards as lacking credibility. Of course this is another diversionary tactic, because, for the sake of discussion, Jeremiah could have been right in one prophecy and wrong in another. We are not debating Jeremiah's inerrancy, nor the implications of errancy on the doctrine of divine inspiration; we are debating whether or not the one prophecy under discussion was fulfilled. Nevertheless, because Jeremiah's credibility has some bearing on the reliability of his book in general, I address Mr. Till's credibility attack.
Evidently this attack represents Till's best shot. But I am surprised that he would make such an issue over such a minor difficulty--a difficulty to him perhaps, but not to reasonable people. Mr. Till presented Jeremiah's prediction of the death of King Zedekiah (Jeremiah 34:2-5) and an alleged contradiction of that prediction in the record of his death (52:9-11). Although the prediction contained specific details, and the record of his death verified most of those details, Mr. Till was disturbed that whereas Jeremiah predicted Zedekiah would "die in peace," the latter record indicated that he died in prison. Mr. Till regards this as a contradiction.
Evidently Mr. Till imagines that to "die in peace" meant that the king would die in freedom, honor, and dignity, and that to die in prison meant dying as a result of being treated with dishonor and torture. But this is not necessarily the case. It is more likely that there was some degree of chivalry among ancient monarchs, and even though captured kings were enemies, they were treated with dignity and respect. For example, in later years King Jehoiachin was released from prison, given a lifetime pension, and promoted to a prominent seat among the other released kings (Jeremiah 52:31-43). This demonstrates that the Babylonian kings treated captive monarchs with some measure of respect. The expression "to die in peace" is commonly understood to mean a natural death as opposed to a gruesome death resulting from war, crime, violence, or suffering. This is verified by Jeremiah's own words that clarify his intended meaning in this passage: "You shall not die by the sword. You shall die in peace" (34:4-5). There is nothing contradictory in the idea of one dying peacefully in prison. Mr. Till's hostility toward the Bible has created an illusion of contradiction where none exits. Since it is much more likely that the term was used in its common, natural sense rather than in the unnatural, contradictory sense imagined by Mr. Till, no reason exists for questioning Jeremiah's credibility.
Next Mr. Till quibbled that "there is no indication that incense was burned in memory of Zedekiah as Jeremiah had predicted." Of course this is a fallacious argument from silence, for Mr. Till has no contrary evidence to present. His rationalization that the Jews were widely scattered is not factual. All the records indicate that the Jews were taken to the province of Babylon, that many of them built houses, raised families, and engaged into business; some even became high ranking government officials. Their standard of living in Babylon became so prosperous and satisfactory that most of them chose not to return to Israel at the end of the seventy years. There is no reason to believe that the Jews would have been denied the privilege of giving their fallen king an honorable burial. This is supported by Josephus: "When the king was come to Babylon, he kept Zedekiah in prison until he died, and buried him magnificently, and dedicated the vessels he pillaged out of the temple of Jerusalem to his own gods, and planted the people in the country of Babylon, but freed the high priest from his bonds." (Antiquities of the Jews, 10:9:7).
Thus Mr. Till's best shot at Jeremiah's credibility missed the target and exposed his own hostile imagination. If this is the best that Till can do, then Jeremiah's credibility remains unscathed.
Jeremiah's Rationality: Next Mr. Till questioned Jeremiah's rationality for somehow not correcting the imagined contradiction between the prophecy and the actual death of Zedekiah. Of course, as I indicated above, no real contradiction exists. So no reason existed for altering either the prophecy or the record of Zedekiah's death. The problem exists only in the mind of Mr. Till who fails to read correctly. If he had read the last verse of chapter 51, he would know that Jeremiah's material stopped there. Chapter 52 is a historical appendix written by a later hand, probably Jeremiah's young assistant Baruch. So if Mr. Till wants to question the rationality of someone it should be that of Baruch not Jeremiah. But evidently Baruch saw no contradiction with Jeremiah's prophecy in the idea that Zedekiah died peacefully in prison--good reasoning as far as I'm concerned.
Jeremiah's Veracity: Next, since Mr. Till could not produce objective evidence that the debated prophecy was not fulfilled, he resorted to questioning Jeremiah's veracity by accusing him of lying to the princes of Judah (38:27). Actually what Jeremiah did was withhold information that would have resulted in his death. No one is expected to relate information that would jeopardize his own life. Jeremiah had done nothing worthy of death. All he had done was to advise the king on how to avoid the destruction of the city and the death of his household and many of his officials. Having been so advised, the king charged Jeremiah, under threat of death, not to disclose their discussion to the princes. Instead, the king commanded him to tell the princes: "I presented my request before the king, that he would not make me return to Jonathan's house to die there" (38:26). When the princes interrogated Jeremiah under threat of death, his life was in double jeopardy. If he disclosed what he advised the king, he would die; and if he remained silent, he would die. So he protected his life by obeying the king's command, but in so doing he did not lie. Jeremiah indeed had previously made that request of the king: "Therefore please hear now, O my lord the king. Please, let my petition be accepted before you, and do not make me return to the house of Jonathan the scribe, lest I die there" (37:20). Thus what Jeremiah told the princes was true. So Mr. Till has falsely accused Jeremiah of lying. What reasonable person would question Jeremiah's veracity under those circumstances? Would Mr. Till have handled the situation any differently? Far from being untrustworthy, Jeremiah's veracity as a historian is to be commended for recording the events as they actually happened without glossing over the gritty details.
Mr. Till further accused Jeremiah of deceiving Zedekiah. He stated: "Jeremiah did not tell him that if he went out of the city to meet the Babylonian princes, all of his sons would be killed in his presence and he himself would be blinded and imprisoned for the rest of his life." Mr. Till is correct, Jeremiah did not tell him that. But in being correct, Till exposed his failure to read correctly and to get the facts straight. Perhaps he has a comprehension problem. He incorrectly led his readers to believe that Zedekiah was treated that way as a result of his surrender to the Babylonian princes; but Zedekiah did not surrender, he tried to escape. Jeremiah made the options clear to Zedekiah; he said: "Thus says the LORD, the God of hosts, the God of Israel: `If you surely surrender to the king of Babylon's princes, then your soul shall live; this city shall not be burned with fire, and you and your house shall live. But if you do not surrender to the king of Babylon's princes, then this city shall be given into the hand of the Chaldeans; they shall burn it with fire, and you shall not escape from their hand'" (38:17-18). He further warned Zedekiah of the dire consequences of attempting to escape (38:21-23). Thus Zedekiah knew his alternatives, but he disbelieved Jeremiah and refused to surrender. Instead, he held out until the Babylonians breached the walls and entered the city; then he escaped with some of his troops. But they were pursued and captured by the Babylonians in the plains of Jericho (39:1-5). Contrary to Till's "revised version," Zedekiah did not surrender to the Babylonian princes, but suffered the consequences of trying to escape in spite of Jeremiah's clear warning. Mr. Till has erroneously accused Jeremiah of deception in this incident. In his best efforts to impugn the veracity of the prophet, Mr. Till has failed miserably. Instead, he has demonstrated his own fallibility.
Valid Text: Next, Mr. Till again questioned the validity of the text of the Book of Jeremiah. He stated: "In biblical times, there were no copyright agencies or archives that registered and kept original works, which could be consulted if questions later arose concerning the reading of the original text and the date of its authorship." Of course, this is not a problem unique to the text of the Bible, but to all ancient historical texts. If such evidence is necessary before an ancient text has validity, then all ancient history is invalid--something Mr. Till is not willing to concede. Indeed, the canons of historical research do not require evidence from sources known to never exist. This is absurd! In reality, what Mr. Till means is that he regards the text of the Book of Jeremiah to be much less reliable than other historical documents, so that one cannot believe what it has recorded. He stated: "All Dr. Price has to offer as evidence are the existing text of Jeremiah and a tradition that the entire book was written by a 7th- and 6th-century prophet named Jeremiah." But all that we have of any ancient historical document is its existing text and the traditions about its authorship. So again, if that invalidates an ancient document, then all ancient history is invalid. No one can take these objections of Till seriously. Other means are available for assessing the validity of an ancient text.
The question about an ancient historical text is: How does one determine its validity and authorship? The validity of a text is determined by the consensus among existing manuscripts and other witnesses, such as translations and ancient quotations. The greater the number of independent witnesses, the more ancient the witnesses, and the greater the consensus among the witnesses, the greater is the probability that the authentic text can be determined. This is the accepted method for evaluating the objective evidence for textual validity. It is known as the science of textual criticism. It applies to all ancient documents.
Mr. Till has called attention to some general problems regarding consensus among the witnesses to the text of Jeremiah; in comparing it with the texts of other biblical books, the text of Jeremiah has more variations. But this problem does not hinder a reasonable recovery of the authentic text. In my earlier discussion of Jeremiah's text, I demonstrated that the text of the debated prophecy is valid, but how does the text of Jeremiah compare with the texts of ancient secular historical documents? In spite of its textual variations, compared with any ancient secular text, the witnesses to the text of Jeremiah far exceed them in number, diversity, antiquity, and consensus; that is, the evidence is extraordinary. Let Mr. Till provide the witnesses to any ancient secular historical document that come anywhere near those for the Book of Jeremiah with respect to number, diversity, antiquity, and consensus; or let him cease quibbling over textual validity.
Authorship: In a court of law and the canons of historical research the authorship of an ancient document is determined by the internal claims of authorship and by internal and external witnesses to that authorship. According to the laws of evidence, such claims to authorship are authentic unless proven otherwise by valid evidence. In this regard, the Book of Jeremiah fares as well or better than any secular document. The prophet Jeremiah is mentioned 117 times in his book; the expression "the word of the LORD came to Jeremiah" (or its equivalent) occurs 29 times (1:1, 4, 11, 13; 2:1; 13:3, 8; 14:1; 16:1 ; 18:5; 24:4; 25:3 ; 28:12; 29:30; 32:6, 26; 33:1, 19, 23; 34:12; 35:12; 36:27; 37:6; 39:15; 42:7; 43:8; 46:1; 47:1; 49:4); in addition, the expression "The LORD said to Jeremiah (or its equivalent) occurs another 16 times (1:7, 9, 12, 14; 3:6, 11; 11:6, 9; 13:1, 6; 14:11, 14; 15:1; 17:19; 24:3; 32:25). Often Jeremiah referred to himself by first person pronouns that indicate he was the narrator/writer. Four times the book records that God commanded Jeremiah to write portions of the book (22:30; 30:2; 36:2, 28); three times it records that Baruch wrote portions of the book at the dictation of Jeremiah (36:4, 18, 32); and once it records that Jeremiah himself wrote a portion (51: 60). Finally, the entire collection, from chapter one through fifty-one, is attributed to Jeremiah: "Thus far are the words of Jeremiah" (51:64). Other forms of internal evidence point to Jeremiah as the narrator/writer.
Thus the internal evidence is strong, and is supported by three independent external witnesses (2 Chronicles 36:12, 21, 22; Ezra 1:1; Daniel 9:2). True, these witnesses are in the Bible, but they are indeed external to and independent of the Book of Jeremiah. If Mr. Till wants to classify as mere tradition these external references to Jeremiah's authorship, then he must also do the same for external references to the authors of secular historical documents, because none come from more reliable sources. This does not include references to the authorship of Jeremiah in Josephus, in the New Testament, and in the Jewish Mishnah and Talmud. All ancient witnesses agree that the prophet Jeremiah wrote the book; and there are no dissenting witnesses. In other words, as compared with the evidence for ancient secular documents, the objective evidence for the authorship of Jeremiah is extraordinary. Mr. Till will continue quibbling over authorship based on denials written by radical critics. But let the readers be forewarned that these denials are not based on objective evidence, but on subjective theories built on theological presuppositions like Till's anti-supernatural one.
Valid Date: Next, Mr. Till again challenged the date of the debated prophecy. He stated: "the book of Jeremiah does not claim that the prophecy in question was written in the 4th year of Jehoiakim's reign (605 B.C.) but only that the word of Yahweh had come to Jeremiah at that time." Of course, this is an obvious quibble to avoid admitting that the prophecy has a valid date. But this again demonstrates that Mr. Till does not read carefully. Not only is the date recorded for when God gave the prophecy (25:1), but Jeremiah devoted a whole chapter to record when and how he actually wrote the early chapters of the book (36:1-32). In the fourth year of Jehoiakim (605 B. C.), the Lord commanded Jeremiah to write all the words that He had given him up to that time (36:1-2). Jeremiah immediately obeyed. He acquired a parchment scroll and dictated all the words to his amanuensis Baruch, who accurately wrote them down. The scroll was read to King Jehoiakim who then proceeded to burn the scroll leaf by leaf. That the scroll contained the prophecy under debate is indicated by the king's complaint to Jeremiah: "Why have you written in it that the king of Babylon will certainly come and destroy this land, and cause man and beast to cease from here?" (36:29). Note that both the Hebrew text and the Greek Septuagint translation contain the reference to the king of Babylon. Thus the Septuagint also understood that Jeremiah's prophecy referred to the king of Babylon. Shortly after King Jehoiakim burned the first edition of the book, the Lord commanded Jeremiah to rewrite the scroll, which Jeremiah did with expansions (36:27-32). Thus the date of the actual writing of the prophecy is clearly stated as the fourth year of King Jehoiakim (605 B.C.). All Hebrew manuscripts and ancient versions validate that date, so no objective evidence exists that gives reason to doubt it.
Mr. Till presented the events recorded in chapter 52 as evidence that the book, and thus the debated prophecy, was written near or after the end of the seventy year captivity, at least in its final form. This contradicts the evidence I presented above, and the evidence that attributes the content of chapters one through fifty-one to Jeremiah: "Thus far are the words of Jeremiah" (51:64). This statement clearly attributes chapter 52 to a later hand such as Jeremiah's young assistant Baruch.
The evidence indicates that Jeremiah wrote an initial edition of his book in 605 B.C. (including the prophecy under debate) which was destroyed and immediately rewritten; this was followed by one or more additions of Jeremiah's oracles and historical essays which were completed shortly after the destruction of Jerusalem (586 B.C.). This latter edition of the book, which included chapters one through fifty-one, Jeremiah took to Egypt when Johanan forced him to go there. It is likely that Jeremiah edited and expanded the book before he died in Egypt, and that Baruch took the expanded edition to Babylon after Jeremiah's death. Finally, Baruch, or another scribe who inherited Jeremiah's manuscripts, wrote a historical essay that was appended to the text as chapter 52. The shorter edition (including chapter 52) became the tradition used in Egypt and used for translating the Greek Septuagint. The longer edition became the tradition used by the Jews in Babylon which became the proto-Masoretic text.
Apart from a difference in the order of the chapters, the two editions are in essential agreement. Their differences are much like what one would find in comparing two different editions of a text book, one an expanded revision of the other. No textual differences exist that indicate that the author of the historical appendix made any significant changes to Jeremiah's portion of the text. This is certainly true of the prophecy under debate. As I demonstrated in my earlier article, the text of the prophecy is valid for all the important details; all the textual evidence supports the date that the prophecy was given and written, and the seventy year duration of the captivity. The fulfillment was supported by external evidence. Mr. Till's appeal to the historical appendix has no bearing on these details of the prophecy. He has suggested the possibility that the date could have been fraudulently changed. But a possibility is not a reality. Let him produce objective evidence that the date was changed, or let him cease quibbling over what he cannot verify. A charge of fraud is invalid without objective proof, and a date is not invalid just because it disagrees with Mr. Till's theological theories.
Undeniable evidence: Mr. Till challenged me to present "undeniable evidence." I have presented valid objective evidence that Jeremiah's prophecy was fulfilled. In an attempt to discredit my evidence Mr. Till unsuccessfully attacked Jeremiah's credibility, rationality, and veracity. He unsuccessfully attacked the validity of the text, and the authorship and date of the book and the prophecy. In all these attacks, Mr. Till failed to present valid objective evidence that successfully denies the evidence I presented. I was able to show that Mr. Till engaged in unnatural interpretation of common expressions, in misrepresentation of the facts, and in exaggeration of alleged textual problems. In so doing, I was also able to show that the objective evidence for the fulfillment of Jeremiah's prophecy is extraordinary in comparison with similar evidence for ancient secular historic documents. Since Mr. Till was unable to successfully deny the validity of my evidence, I am free to claim that I presented undeniable evidence for a fulfilled prophecy.
(James D. Price, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament,
Temple Baptist Seminary, Chattanooga, TN 37404; e-mail drjdprice@aol.com)
