Heavy demands have prevented me from responding promptly to Mr. Till's recent criticisms of my defense of the fulfilled prophecy in Jeremiah 25:1-13 (TSR, September/October 1997). Because Mr. Till wrote two articles to criticize my second response, I missed seeing some of his criticism until I had submitted my most recent article. In this present article I endeavor to answer the criticisms to which I have not fully responded previously. With this I bring my defense of fulfilled prophecy to a close. The evidence and arguments, both good and bad, have been sufficiently presented. The readers can weigh the evidence on both sides and decide the issue for themselves. I begin first with a few loose ends that deal with some of Mr. Till's quibbles, then I address the principal issues of the debate.
Nonexistent Prophet: Mr. Till asserted that no evidence exists outside of Israel that Jeremiah was a real historical person: "There are no nonbiblical records from Syria or Egypt or Babylon that mention a Hebrew prophet by the name of Jeremiah, who prophesied during the first year of Nebuchadnezzar's reign that the Jews would be taken into bondage but released after seventy years" [TSR, September/October 1997, p. 9]. This is another example of the radical nature of Mr. Till's arguments. There is nothing extraordinary about the existence of prophets among ancient peoples, so why must I produce extraordinary evidence for the historicity of Jeremiah? Does he seriously believe that scholars, critics, and historians doubt the existence of the Biblical Jeremiah? I have yet to read one who does. Even The Interpreter's Bible, which Mr. Till cited as authority, accepts the reality of his existence: "We are in the fortunate position of having more authentic information about Jeremiah than about any other Hebrew prophet, perhaps than any other character in the Old Testament" [vol. 5, pp. 778]. "Yet the book contains a large amount of authentic material from and concerning the prophet himself than some of the others, such as Isaiah" [vol. 5, p. 787]. Thus Mr. Till's own authority indicates that much "authentic" information exists about the historical Jeremiah.
Double Standard: Mr. Till accused me of "demanding that we play on an unlevel field, which would allow [me] to argue from the assumption that biblical miracles, in every case without exception, happened exactly as recorded," whereas he claims that his "insistence has been only that biblical miracles should and must be evaluated by the same standards that are applied to other literary works" [TSR, September/October, 1997, p. 8]. But those statements are false on two counts. First, I have never demanded that we argue on the assumption that miracles actually happen. Let Mr. Till cite any place in this debate where I have made that demand. I have instead insisted that if we debate fulfilled prophecy, the presupposition must be that miracles may be possible, rather than Mr. Till's assumption that miracles are impossible. After all, a genuine fulfilled prophecy may be due to a supernatural revelation. What purpose would there be to debate fulfilled prophecy if the assumption is that miracles (fulfilled prophecy) are impossible. Under that assumption, there is no debate; the issue is settled before discussion begins. But that's the even field on which Mr. Till insists we play. That's stupid! I have insisted that the details of an alleged fulfilled prophecy must be evaluated by the same standards that are applied to other literary works--that is, on an even field. That sounds like the same standard that Mr. Till claims he follows. But let's consider how he plays by those standards.
Mr. Till claims he insists on evaluating the evidence in the Bible by the same standard as he uses for secular sources. But what modern historian doubts the existence of ancient writers like Tacitus or Suetonius, Josephus or Herodotus? Yet Mr. Till doubts the existence of Jeremiah unless there is extraordinary supporting evidence, contrary to almost all contemporary historians and critics. What historian regards these ancient works to be the fraudulent product of multiple authors, editors and redactors, produced over a long extent of time? Yet Mr. Till and his skeptical critics make such extreme claims about the book of Jeremiah. What historian questions the accuracy of the dates these authors assigned to their writings? Yet Mr. Till questions the validity of a date in Jeremiah unless there is extraordinary supporting evidence. Why? Because it is the date of a prophecy. Can anyone seriously believe Mr. Till is really attempting to play on an even field, and that his evaluation of the evidence is not driven by his theological agenda?
Mr. Till's Theology: My objection to Mr. Till's continuous harping on the issue of inerrancy in this debate has resulted in his defense of that tactic. I have stated that the inerrancy of Scripture is not crucial to my arguments. Fulfilled prophecy can be true even if presented in an errant Bible. I have never appealed to the inerrancy of Scripture in this debate, nor do I need to. That is indeed a nonissue in this debate. Mr. Till continues to poison the well with such irrelevant tirades. On the other hand, the existence of God is relevant to the debate. How can we debate the possibility of supernatural revelation of prophecy without considering the possibility of God's existence? Mr. Till objected to my statement that his anti-supernatural presupposition is based on a sequence of unverifiable fabulous claims. He stated that "I have no theology, because I have no belief in gods." But when a person develops organized opinions and arguments about God, revelation, and religion, whether positive or negative, that is a theology. Only a person who takes no serious thought about God and religion has no theology.
I assert again that Mr. Till's theological presupposition is based on a sequence of unverifiable fabulous claims. One of those unverifiable fabulous claims is that God does not exist. Of course he quibbled: "I do not assert that a deity does not exist; I simply say that I do not believe in the existence of a deity" [TSR September/October 1997, p. 8]. But this is just a game of words. Common sense reasoning sees no difference in those two statements in light of the fact that he identifies himself as an atheist, and he insists on the anti-supernatural presupposition. If the evidence is insufficient for him to decide one way or the other, why not remain an agnostic rather [than] opt for atheism? Agnosticism at least keeps the option open to new evidence and better reasoning. But Mr. Till has clearly closed the door--and his mind. He admitted that he, an atheist, demands supernatural evidence for supernatural claims--an oxymoron!
Mr. Till justified his unbelief on the basis of a new hypothesis of the universe by Michio Kaku, which views matter as eternal and "our universe only one bubble of many fluctuating from `an infinite ocean frothing with universes,'" or as a "self-reproducing inflationary universe" [TSR, September/October 1997, p. 8]. In order to avoid the necessary conclusion demanded by the second law of thermodynamics and the objective evidence of a finite but expanding universe, these atheistic physicists have expanded their conception into a mega-universe that is infinite, eternal, and self-perpetuating, one that did not begin with a big-bang, but itself endlessly and simultaneously "bubbles" many micro-universes in and out of existence like a frothing ocean. Of course, this hypothesis is unverifiable, making use of such terms as "immortal," "eternal," and "infinite." Evidently it is proper to apply these terms to a physical system, but not to a supernatural deity. None of these attributes are verifiable by physical measurements, but must, by their very nature, be part of the presuppositions of the hypothesis. The existence of multitudes of other universes is also unverifiable, but must be part of the presuppositions. Scientists have not probed the depths of our own universe, let alone detected the existence of others. Contrary to the first law of thermodynamics, such an eternal, self-perpetuating ocean must presuppose the existence of an infinite and inexhaustible source of new energy within the system, or else postulate that the system "creates" the new energy necessary to perpetuate the eternal frothing. Otherwise the second law of thermodynamics would have forced the frothing ocean into equilibrium, and it would have settled into a motionless nothingness by now, after the passage of an infinite period of time in the past. This hypothesis looks very much like the method a physicist would use to describe pantheism in physical and mathematical terms. All this hypothesis does is add a new unverifiable fabulous claim to the chain of other unverifiable fabulous claims upon which Mr. Till's theological presupposition hangs.
I wonder what unverifiable hypothesis Mr. Till accepted as true before this one came along, and I wonder how gullible he will be to jump on the band wagon of the next unverifiable hypothesis that comes down the pike. And he calls this common sense! Mr. Till appealed to the authority of many physicists who are seeking naturalistic explanations for the existence of the universe. What he failed to mention is that these physicist do not enjoy a consensus about such naturalistic explanations, but are just as controversial among themselves as the radical literary critics are. Another thing he failed to mention is that a recent survey in the journal Nature "revealed that 40% of American physicists, biologists and mathematicians believe in God--and not just in some metaphysical abstraction, but a deity who takes an active interest in our affairs and hears our prayers: the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" [The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, Dec. 24, 1997]. This does not include those who may be theistic, but not of that persuasion, or those who are simply agnostics. It is unlikely that a large percentage of physicists, biologists and mathematicians hold the extreme atheistic theology of Mr. Till, Kaku, and Linde. I am, after all, in good company.
Modern Miracles: Mr. Till scoffed at the two examples of modern miracles that I submitted at his request. Particularly he was critical of the claim that Mrs. Marolyn Ford had her sight instantaneously restored in response to prayer, after being blind for over eleven years due to the disease of macular degeneration. According to The American Medical Association Encyclopedia of Medicine, macular degeneration destroys the retinal nerve tissue and replaces it with scar tissue, and the disorder is untreatable [Charles B. Clayman, ed. New York: Random House, 1989, p. 658]. That is, once the retinal nerves are destroyed, spontaneous remission is impossible. Mrs. Ford's sight has been near normal for about 25 years now. Her restored sight is a miracle like the restoring of sight to the blind as recorded in the Bible. Mrs. Ford is still living and presumably her medical records are available. Instead of investigating the report, Mr. Till scoffed because the story was published by a publisher unknown to him, rather than by a prominent one. What does the notoriety of the publisher have to do with whether the story is true or not? Why would Mr. Till not investigate the alleged miracle and expose it as a fraud or a natural recovery, if that's what he believes, rather than merely scoff? Is this the behavior of one who wants to know the truth? Hardly. It is the behavior of a person with a closed mind. Let him expose the alleged miracle as a fraud or let him accept what Mrs. Ford accepts, that her restored sight is a miracle. We know why Mr. Till has not checked this one out. He claims that he does not accept the possibility of miracles because he has never seen one. However, if he looks at this one, he might have to change his mind and admit the possibility. He might have to admit that since miracles actually occur today, they may also have happened in Biblical times. That would destroy the whole foundation of his theology.
Other Misrepresentations: The following are a few more instances where Mr. Till has ignorantly, or perhaps willfully, misrepresented the facts: (1) Mr. Till stated: "However, in the Septuagint... chapter 51 is chapter 28, and 51:64 isn't even in the text" [TSR, September/October 1997, p. 10]. He is right, chapter 51 in the Masoretic text is chapter 28 in the Septuagint text. However, 51:64 is 28:54 in the Septuagint. It reads: "and shalt say, Thus shall Babylon sink, and not rise, because of the evils which I bring upon it" (Jeremiah 28:64, LXX). Note that what is missing is the words "Thus far are the words of Jeremiah," not the whole verse. These words are missing because in the way the chapters are arranged in the LXX, the words of Jeremiah do not end there. Mr. Till failed to correctly represent the Septuagint here.
(2) Mr. Till stated "Furthermore, chapter 52 in the Septuagint begins with verses that aren't in the Masoretic [text]: `The word which Jeremias the prophet spoke to Baruch son of Nerias, when he wrote these words in the book from the mouth of Jeremias....'" This is false. These words occur in the Masoretic text in 45:1. Masoretic chapter 45 occurs in the Septuagint as 51:31-35, which reads, "The word which Jeremias the prophet spoke to Baruch son of Nerias, when he wrote these words in the book from the mouth of Jeremias...." Chapter 52 in the Septuagint begins with the same words as found in the Masoretic text: "It was the twenty-first year of Sedekias, when he began to reign, and he reigned eleven years in Jerusalem. And his mother's name was Amitaal, the daughter of Jeremias, of Lobena" (Jeremiah 52:1 LXX). An English translation of the Masoretic text of 52:1 reads: "Zedekiah was twenty-one years old when he became king, and he reigned eleven years in Jerusalem. His mother's name was Hamutal the daughter of Jeremiah of Libnah (Jeremiah 52:1). Mr. Till has erroneously identified the start of chapter 52, and has contradicted his critical authority, The Interpreter's Bible, which states that "Ch[apter] 52 is an appendix to the book of Jeremiah added in order to show how some of his prophecies were fulfilled" [vol. 5, p. 790]. Evidently Mr. Till did not do his homework. The passage he said does not occur in the Masoretic text really does, and the passage that he said begins chapter 52 in the Septuagint really doesn't.
(3) Mr. Till stated "that Dr. Price's 605 B. C. dating of the prophecy is clearly wrong and that `Jeremiah' had directed the prophecy to the exiles who had been captured in 597 B. C." [TSR, September/October, 1997, pp. 10, 16]. First of all, I did not date the prophecy in 605 B. C., Jeremiah did! He wrote: "The word that came to Jeremiah concerning all the people of Judah, in the fourth year of Jehoiakim the son of Josiah, king of Judah" (Jeremiah 25:1). Historians agree that the fourth year of Jehoiachim was 605 B. C. Let Mr. Till accuse the historical authorities of error, not me. If Mr. Till insists that the date given in 25:1 is fraudulent, then let him produce the proof, or accept the date that all objective evidence supports. Notice also that the prophecy was directed to "all the people of Judah," not to exiles. Mr. Till has twisted the words of the text to make it appear that this prophecy and the one in chapter 29 are the same. But even a casual reading of chapter 29 indicates that his audience was different and the date was different. Please, Farrell, it is not kosher to alter the text! Let's play the game by the rules.
Supernatural Proof: I was correct when I declared that Mr. Till believes that supernatural claims demand supernatural proof. He admitted it when he stated: "I'm going to surprise him and admit that in the cases of some extraordinary claims, this is exactly what I am saying" [TSR September/October 1997, p. 7]. I am indeed surprised that he would admit what is obvious from his arguments. By this he contradicts himself because he does not believe in the supernatural, and he admits that no amount of objective evidence will convince him. His mind is made up. Now the ordinary understanding of the statement "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" is that such claims expect more than the normal convincing evidence, but not supernatural evidence. So, for example, instead of a normal hypothesis being statistically verified at the 95% level, an unusual one may require verification at the 99% level, or an extraordinary one at the 99.9% level. But to admit that no amount of evidence would be convincing is what most people call radical.
Poisoning the Well: Mr. Till accused me of ad hominem rhetoric because I referred to him as a radical skeptic. I'm sure he does not object to the term "skeptic," so he must object to the term "radical." But by his own admission his skepticism of supernatural events is radically extreme. He refuses to even entertain the possibility of anything supernatural. No amount of evidence will convince him otherwise. On the other hand he does not hesitate to refer to me with rhetorically poisoned terms such as "fundamentalist" and "biblicist" and to my position as "the Never-Never Land." No one is convinced that he meant the use of those terms in other than a derogatory sense. His ad hominem rhetoric is admissible in this debate, but mine is not. Come on, Farrell! Let's be consistent. You admitted that you're a radical.
Null Hypothesis: Now that I have covered Mr. Till's quibbles, it is time to get down to brass tacks. Mr. Till has objected to my appeal to his failure to prove the null hypothesis, as though that is a violation of the laws of logic. In this objection he reveals that he does not understand the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is governed by the laws of logic, and proceeds from postulates to conclusions. Such conclusions are understood to have been proven absolutely, based on the assumed certainty of the postulates. Such postulates are understood to be self-evident truths that require no proof and that are universally accepted. Mr. Till's anti-supernatural presupposition does not fall into this category: it is not self-evident, and it is far from being universally accepted in domains outside of natural science. Deductive reasoning is used in the disciplines of mathematics, propositional calculus, and the like. But even in deductive reasoning the null hypothesis is valid. It is one of the fundamental postulates of logic: the law of noncontradiction: Propositions A and not-A cannot both be true at the same time. Therefore, if one proves not-A by valid logical reasoning, then proposition A cannot be true in the same domain of postulates.
In deductive logic one may not presuppose what is to be proven--that is a logical fallacy known as circular reasoning. That is why, in this debate, I continue to insist that Mr. Till must not presuppose that predictive prophecy is impossible. Predictive prophecy is what is to be proved or disproved. It is circular reasoning to appeal to that supposition in this debate. Further, in deductive reasoning, one cannot draw conclusions from the specific to the general, from "some" to "all." That is, one cannot reason that because he has never observed X, therefore X is impossible--that is the fallacy known as a hasty generalization. But that is the type of reasoning Mr. Till wants to be accepted in this debate.
Inductive reasoning begins with observed facts and seeks to develop hypotheses and theories that explain the data. Objective evidence is gathered and studied, and a hypothesis is proposed. The hypothesis is subjected to statistical analysis to determine how well it explains the observed data. A hypothesis that has strong statistical support is regarded as a reasonable explanation of the observed data. Inductive reasoning is used in scientific investigations and historical research. In this type of research, a common method for validating a hypothesis is to disprove the null hypothesis, that is, to show that the opposing hypothesis is contrary to the observed evidence. If the null hypothesis is statistically disproved beyond the 95% level of certainty, the hypothesis is regarded as valid. This is a widely accepted scientific method. Mr. Till objected that "there is about as much 'science' in the hermeneutical methods of prophecy-fulfillment as there is in astrology and fortune-telling" [TSR, July/August 1997, p. 2]. Our investigation is one of historical research, not of hermeneutics, one of evaluating objective historical evidence, not of "interpreting" texts. This is the tactic of ridicule without dealing with the issues.
Mr. Till's example of an alien spacecraft completely misses the point. He stated: "If I cannot prove that an alien spacecraft did not crash near Roswell, NM, 50 years ago, my failure to prove that this did not happen in no way constitutes proof that it did" [TSR, September/October, p. 6]. This indicates that he either does not understand the significance of a null hypothesis, or he has tried to confuse the readers. The question here is not whether something crashed near Roswell--the discovered wreckage indicates that something did crash. The real question is: was the crashed vehicle an alien spacecraft? The null hypothesis to prove in this case is: The crashed vehicle was not an alien spacecraft, but one of known terrestrial origin. Presumably objective evidence exists to answer that question. Why the evidence has not been published and publicly evaluated is another question not relevant to this debate.
A null hypothesis must be proved or disproved on the basis of valid objective evidence, not on a lack of evidence. To prove the null hypothesis means that the available objective evidence strongly supports the null hypothesis instead of the hypothesis. To disprove the null hypothesis means that the available objective evidence does not support the null hypothesis but the hypothesis. In this debate, the null hypothesis is: (1) Jeremiah did not write the prediction in approximately 605 BC; (2) the Jews did not enter servitude to the king of Babylon; (3) at the end of approximately 70 years, king of Babylon was not judged and the Jewish servitude was not ended. I have presented objective evidence that strongly supports the fulfillment of Jeremiah's prophecy. Mr. Till has not invalidated that evidence or produced objective evidence to prove the null hypothesis. Instead, he has presented alternate possibilities based on unverifiable, subjective theories. His alternate possibilities amount to new claims. If my claims must be proved, then his claims must be proved. It is not sufficient to present alternate possibilities without proof. His alternate possibilities must be shown to satisfy the historical evidence better than my claim does. Otherwise, my claim stands unrefuted. So far Mr. Till has failed to do that.
Burden of Proof: Mr. Till has accused me of shifting the burden of proof from my position to his. That this is a false accusation should be obvious to any unbiased reader. I have presented strong objective evidence to support my position and have shown that his objections are unreasonable. Mr. Till has objected to my evidence on the basis of subjective theories which he has offered as an alternative explanation. What I have demanded is that he show how his alternative hypothesis better satisfies the available objective evidence; that is what I mean by proving the null hypothesis. That is not shifting the burden of proof. It is demanding a reasonable justification for a proposed alternative. Otherwise, without such justification, an alternative remains merely that--an unverified alternative. What is his proposed alternative?--Jeremiah did not write the prophecy in 605 B.C., but the prophecy is a fraud perpetrated by an unknown group of unknown authors, editors, and redactors in an unknown sequence of additions, deletions, and alterations at unknown times after the Jews returned from the Babylonian Captivity. Now why shouldn't he be challenged to demonstrate how that extraordinary claim better satisfies the objective evidence? Does he really think his common sense readers are naive enough to accept that claim as reasonable without convincing objective evidence? His complaint is an attempt to cover up the weakness of his position. I don't regard my demand as a violation of the rules of debate. Instead, I regard it as a effort to get to the truth.
Mr. Till insists that the burden of proof should be one-sided--on my position. He attempted to justify that stance on the basis that my claim is extraordinary, and that extraordinary claims do not require disproof. However, he admitted that "in debating an unextraordinary proposition, both sides should share the burden of proof" [TSR, Sept./Oct. 1997, p. 7]. But let's consider the extraordinary nature of my claim of fulfilled prophecy. What is extraordinary about a man making a prediction on a certain date? That is an ordinary historical event which can be supported by ordinary historical evidence. The fourth year of Jehoiakim is accepted as 605 B. C. by most modern historians. Why not demand that ordinary historical evidence be produced to disprove such an event and its date? What is extraordinary about an ancient people being put into servitude to an alien king? It happened all the time. It is an ordinary historical event which can be supported by ordinary historical evidence, and this ordinary historical event and its date are almost universally accepted by modern historians. Why not demand that ordinary historical evidence be produced to disprove such an ancient servitude? What is extraordinary about a kingdom being deposed and people being released from servitude? This event and its date are supported by ordinary historical evidence which is almost universally accepted by modern historians. Why not demand that ordinary historical evidence be produced to disprove such an ancient release from servitude? These are all ordinary happenings that any unbiased skeptic should require only ordinary historical evidence to validate, and should expect ordinary historical evidence to refute. I have presented objective historical evidence to substantiate the validity of all three ordinary aspects of my claim. It is not unreasonable for an unbiased skeptic to expect Mr. Till to produce objective historical evidence to refute these ordinary aspects of my claim.
Only two aspects of my position are extraordinary: (1) Jeremiah claimed that his prediction came from God; and (2) the temporal orientation of these three ordinary events constitutes an extraordinary happening--a fulfilled prediction that is beyond the normal expectations of human foresight. It is the temporal orientation of the events to which Mr. Till objects. He asserted that the book of Jeremiah "is the work of many writers over a long period of time" [TSR, September/October, p. 10]. By such a statement Mr. Till has claimed that the text is fraudulent. However, as I demonstrate later, a claim of fraud requires proof; such a claim is invalid without proof.
There is nothing extraordinary about Jeremiah's claim itself; many similar claims are known. What would be extraordinary is that God actually gave Jeremiah the prediction. However, no direct evidence can be offered to support that claim. Jeremiah's claim is either true or false without direct proof one way or the other. Mr. Till stated that I must prove that the prophecy "was supernaturally revealed to Jeremiah" [TSR, September/October 1997, p. 7]. No, all I must demonstrate is that a genuine prophecy was fulfilled and that there is a reasonable possibility that it was supernaturally revealed. Mr. Till's three criteria for a genuine fulfilled prophecy, which I accepted as valid for this debate, did not include proof that the prediction came from a supernatural source.
One can allow for the possible truth of Jeremiah's claim based on the verified temporal orientation of these three ordinary historical events. Assuming that the dates are valid, the temporal orientation must be regarded as valid evidence of a genuine fulfilled prophecy. Since all agree that such a fulfilled prophecy is beyond natural expectation, the explanation must be either that it is a chance coincidence or that it is the result of something beyond mere natural phenomenon. Both possibilities are equally improbable from a purely naturalistic perspective; and for an unbiased skeptic, the evidence does not exclude the possibility of the supernatural origin of the prophecy. The possibility can be excluded only by a fallacious appeal to Mr. Till's anti-supernatural presupposition. But that presupposition is valid only in investigations into the laws of nature. This debate is not about the laws of nature but about the possibility of a supernatural origin of prophecy in the Bible. I have presented evidence that at least one genuine prophecy in the Bible was fulfilled. This verifies the possibility of the supernatural origin of prophecy in the Bible. Mr. Till will opt for the possibility that the fulfillment of this prophecy is strictly due to coincidence. But he should admit that this choice is based strictly on his preference of an unprovable theological presupposition, not on objective evidence. The evidence does not deny but rather admits the possibility of a supernatural origin.
Till's Alternate Claim: In an attempt to refute my claim of fulfilled prophecy, Mr. Till countered with a claim that the book of Jeremiah is a fraud, especially his prophecy. However, such a claim must be proved. An alternative possibility remains merely a possibility without proof. Simon Greenleaf, who held the seat of the Royal Professorship of Law in Harvard Law School and who was a recognized authority on jurisprudence, cited the municipal law regarding ancient documents: "Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise" [The Testimony of the Evangelists, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1965, p. 7].
Now the book of Jeremiah is known to be ancient, and its text comes from the proper custody of succeeding generations of ancient authorities. These authorities regarded the book to be genuine as opposed to other books that they dismissed as nonauthoritative. The book is regarded as a reliable historical resource by both ancient and modern historians. Therefore, since Mr. Till claims that the book is a forgery, he has the burden to prove that claim. In an effort to support his claim of forgery, Mr. Till has made the following additional claims that need proof: (1) the text of the book of Jeremiah is very unreliable; (2) the manuscript evidence does not support a sixth-century origin of the book; (3) the book was not written by Jeremiah in the sixth century B. C., but by a sequence of unknown authors, editors, and redactors in postcaptivity times; (4) Jeremiah was an irrational deceiver; (5) Jeremiah was a plagiarist; (6) the text was altered in the era of the second temple to give the appearance of a fulfilled prophecy. Each of these alternative claims require proof, but Mr. Till has failed to produce any convincing objective evidence for any, only unverifiable subjective theories.
(James D. Price, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old
Testament, Temple Baptist Seminary, Chattanooga, TN 37404; e-mail,
drjdprice@aol.com)
